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Abstract Issues about information spring up wherever one scratches the surface
of logic. Here is a case that raises delicate issues of ‘factual’ versus ‘procedural’
information, or ‘statics’ versus ‘dynamics’. What does intuitionistic logic, perhaps the
earliest source of informational and procedural thinking in contemporary logic, really
tell us about information? How does its view relate to its ‘cousin’ epistemic logic?
We discuss connections between intuitionistic models and recent protocol models for
dynamic-epistemic logic, as well as more general issues that emerge.
Keywords Information · Intuitionistic logic · Epistemic logic · Dynamic logic
1 Logic and information, a web of story lines
The notion of information is not a standard theme in logic, but it really lies everywhere
close to the surface. Last year, editing the Handbook of the Philosophy of Informa-
tion with Pieter Adriaans, it fell to me at a late stage to help write a chapter on this
theme (van Benthem and Martinez 2007). I quickly found an ‘embarras de richesse’:
many natural notions of information occur entangled in logic, and their relations are
often unclear. Epistemic logic describes information of agents in terms of ranges of
possible worlds, and its dynamic versions describe the informational processes that
update these ranges: observation, conversation, and the like. Situation theory focuses
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on correlations between local states of the world, and how agents stay attuned to these.
These two semantic views merge naturally in what might be called ‘temporal event
models’, but they do not exhaust the scene. Logic also has a pervasive third, proof-the-
oretic or algorithmic notion of information as code, manipulated by dynamic processes
of ‘elucidation’, such as proof or computation. These do not produce information in
the same sense as semantic update, since they work on more finely structured data,
often represented in formal or natural languages. The relation between semantic and
proof-theoretic accounts of information is a major challenge, though there are prom-
ising attempts at the abstraction level of relevant and categorial logics. In the smaller
compass of logic, this diversity reflects the many complementary stances in science in
general, from logic to Shannon information theory or Kolmogorov complexity, whose
integration raises intriguing foundational questions for the philosophy of information
as put on the map in the cited Handbook (cf. also van Benthem 2007).
But the immediate impetus for this short note comes from Sebastian Sequoiah-
Grayson, who observed the same diversity within my own mind! Over the years, I
have written about information in different frameworks, without checking for con-
sistency, let alone reconciliation. Is there any thread linking the categorial Lambek
Calculus as information theory (van Benthem 1991), modal and temporal logics of
information (van Benthem 1989, 1996b), and dynamic epistemic logic (van Benthem
2006b)? My original plan for this paper was to show there was, but the grand story is
too large, and still in the clouds.
So, here is my actual theme, having more to do with Dutch patriotism. Toward the
end of the above-mentioned Handbook chapter, there is a short passage on what may
be the earliest logical system based on considerations of information, viz. intuitionistic
logic. And before doing anything else, it seemed of interest to get clear on that. What
vision of information underlies intuitionism, and what issues does this raise?
2 Intuitionistic logic and information
2.1 Constructive proof
Intuitionism views mathematics as a web of constructive proof patterns and match-
ing definitions of objects. Thus, it infuses the logical constants of propositional or
predicate logic with a proof-theoretic spirit, summed up in the famous Brouwer-
Heyting-Kolmogorov ‘provability interpretation’ (van Dalen and Troelstra 1988).
For instance, a proof of a conjunction A ∧ B is a pair of proofs for A and for B,
and a proof for an implication A → B is a method for transforming proofs of A into
proofs of B.
2.2 Semantics
Over time, intuitionistic logic has picked up semantic models of independent interest,
starting with algebraic and topological interpretations in the 1930s. Then, Beth (1956)
proposed models on topological Baire space, or equivalently, over trees of finite or
infinite sequences. These trees model abstract processes of investigation, and in line
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with the proof idea, intuitionistic formulas are true at a node when they are ‘veri-
fied’ there. By now, the dominant version of this idea are intuitionistic Kripke models
(Kripke 1963), which we will take here as partial orders M = (W,≤, V ) with a
valuation V , setting:
M, s  p iff s ∈ V (p)
M, s  ϕ ∧ ψ iff M, s  ϕ and M, s  ψ
M, s  ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, s  ϕ or M, s  ψ
M, s  ϕ → ψ iff for all t ≥ s, i f M, t  ϕ, then M, t  ψ
M, s  ¬ϕ iff for no t ≥ s, M, t  ϕ1
Here, in line with the idea of ‘accumulating certainty’, the valuation is ‘persistent’:
if M, s  p, and s ≤ t , then also M, t  p.
There is no revision en route. The truth definition lifts this behaviour to all complex
formulas. E.g., a negation says that the formula itself will never become true at any
further stage of the process. This explains why classical Excluded Middle p ∨ ¬p is
invalid, since this formula fails at states where p is not yet verified, though it will later
become so. This may happen in situations of several types: compare the black dots
in the two pictures below, which stand for the beginnings of informational process
that unfold as downward trees. We will discuss their differences in terms of dynamic
information flow below2:
p p 
Here, one might criticize intuitionistic negation for failing to distinguish between two
notions that are not obviously the same: (a) global future absence of verification,
and (b) the intuitively more primitive notion of local falsification, which has been
emphasized by Wansing, Gurevich and many others (cf. Wansing 1996). Indeed, at
end-points in the above structures (leaves of the pictured trees), the above semantics
makes a volte-face, reading lack of further verification as falsity in the current situa-
tion: something which seems contrived. I am in sympathy with this criticism, but will
not pursue it here.
2.3 Interpreting the models
Now, what do these semantic models really stand for? It is of interest to read sources
like van Dalen and Troelstra (1988) or Dummett (1977) to see what they say on this
crucial matter. Indeed, they do not address this issue in detail at all. But they do say
informally, by way of motivating the mathematical formalism, that a model describes
1 The technical differences between Beth and Kripke models will mostly not concern us here.
2 For instance, unlike the first, the second process reaches an end-point where ¬p holds.
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a process of investigation by an agent, and that its worlds are ‘information situations’
or information stages’ where certain ‘knowledge’ has already been achieved.3 One
reason why the story remains thin is that, in intuitionistic logic like in many other
areas of logic, semantics followed proof theory—and models were devised to make
sure that an already given language got a meaning, and some given proof calculus
turned out complete. The very term semantics has this flavour: models come in the
service of some given practice. But one can also take the opposite viewpoint, with
semantic structures themselves as the primary object of study. That is what we will do
in this paper.4
To return to our main concern, what notion of information is represented by intui-
tionistic models, of the Beth or Kripke variety? Henceforth, we just think of branching
tree-like models, because they are closest to the intuitionistic tradition, and most con-
genial to our discussion. To make things easier, let us assume the trees are finite.5
Intuitively, each branching tree describes an informational process where an agent
learns progressively about the state of the actual world, encoded in a propositional
valuation. At end-points of the tree, all information is in, and the agent knows all the
facts about the actual world.
2.4 Process equivalence and bisimulation
A lot can be asked about such models without yet having any language at all, just
given their process flavour. In particular, when are two informational processes of this
sort equivalent? When the set of propositional valuations on the leaves is the same?
Or when they are similar in some stricter sense, taking into account how the inter-
mediate stages lie? As a concrete illustration, in the former sense, the following two
information models are equivalent, while in the latter, they are not:
3 Dummett even gives two different readings of the turn-style , which we forego here.
4 This may be the more common stance in science. If the above structures really model information pro-
cesses, then we want to study them for their own sake—and only ask later what language can describe
them, and what sort of logic then emerges. But even with models originally invented as semantics for some
language, one must always ask if that language is really the most appropriate medium for describing them.
There is a healthy spiral of iterative redesign for both languages and models, with two independent levels.
Indeed, for intuitionistic logic, it has been asked why it sticks to the vocabulary of classical logic: tacitly,
and perhaps infelicitously, adopting ‘the other’s turf’ for stating its own basic tenets and its deviant views.
The same distinction plays in philosophical logic. Some people say we are just analyzing meanings of key
notions in logic: natural language is given first, and it has a stable semantic content that just needs to be
brought forth. I myself think such stable linguistic usage largely an illusion, and feel that we are mostly
engaged in conceptual analysis and Carnapian ‘rational reconstruction’ at the level of models, fitting our
language later to our design for the task at hand. In particular, intuitionistic logic is not a theory of meaning
of logical constants, alternative to their ‘classical meanings’. It is rather an analysis of information and
constructive reasoning, and the intuitionistic language should be the best system of ‘logical switches’ that
make such reasoning work—even if this means extending the classical languages of logic.
5 Everything I say makes sense for trees with infinite branches, too, but I want to keep things light. Even
so, I may be skipping a finesse here. As Dan Isaacson pointed out: infinite Beth models and finite Kripke
models take a slightly different view of things that will be relevant below.
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1     1
2 p, q      3 p, ¬q  4 ¬p, q                5    p 
2 p, q  3 p, ¬q 4 ¬p, q 
Intuitionistic formulas can easily differentiate between the roots of these two models,6
since they side with modal logic on the finer structural equivalence of bisimulation,
which records choices at intermediate stages.7 Bisimulation is a standard equiva-
lence from process theory, but there are others. Indeed, it seems a legitimate, though
neglected, foundational issue deserving explicit discussion which notion of process
equivalence is most appropriate to information gathering over time.
2.5 A crucial distinction
But the main point of our discussion is rather the following fundamental distinction
concerning information which comes to light here. Intuitionistic logic really registers
two basic kinds of information:
(a) factual information about how the world is; but on a par with this:
(b) procedural information about our current investigative process.
To me, the latter feature concerning the way we learn the facts is the real semantic side
of ‘constructivism’. How we get our ‘knowledge that’ matters deeply, and while the
leaves record factual information, the branching structure of our tree models, and in
particular, available and missing intermediate points, encodes agents’ knowledge of
the latter kind.8,9 What is more, the distinction between factual and procedural infor-
mation is not just an ad-hoc invention in our setting here: it makes sense everywhere,
as soon as you grasp it.
6 The simple verification, as well as later elementary observations of this sort are left to the reader.
7 For a definition, we refer to the standard literature: e.g., Blackburn et al. (2000). Indeed, all intuition-
istic models are equivalent to tree models, up to bisimulation—though this format also suppresses some
interesting structure: see our discussion of process types in Sect. 3.
8 Tim Williamson has asked whether the distinction ‘factual’/‘procedural’ is really robust as a feature of
information. I tend to think it is context-dependent, but illuminating all the same.
9 As it stands, intuitionistic logics puts very few constraints on informational processes. For instance, dif-
ferent branches of the tree may have very diverse ‘leaps’ of informative value from node to node. Indeed, if
we make the trees more uniform, say, by requiring that the admissible steps are precisely those correspond-
ing to getting to know just one atomic proposition at a time, we get stronger logics, describing particular
types of process. This perspective might give a new view of so-called ‘intermediate logics’ in between
intuitionistic and classical logic. Usually just a belt of ‘asteroids’ in between two planets, these may now
arise as well-motivated information theories.
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3 Modal logic and information
3.1 Intuitionistic logic and ‘information loading’
We said before that providing semantic models for a language does not imply that the
language is best for those models. Which language best describes the informational
processes that intuitionism is, or should be, concerned with? Intuitionistic proposi-
tional logic focuses exclusively on stable knowledge achieved by a certain stage, no
matter how the process continues from there on. And it does so in a rather peculiar
way, viz. by ‘loading’ the account of the logical constants. Thus, ‘not-A’ does not only
say that we do not have A right at the current stage, but also that we will never get it,
where ‘never’ refers to the future of the current process. van Benthem (1993) calls this
‘information loading’ feature of intuitionism implicit knowledge, and contrasts it with
the explicit knowledge found in epistemic logic, which keeps the classical account of
the Boolean operations, but adds an explicit modal operator
Kϕ saying that the agent knows that ϕ, or semantically, M, s  Kϕ iff ϕ is true
in all worlds t epistemically accessible from s in M.
Of course, loading allows the intuitionistic language to express interesting notions.
For instance, the formula ¬¬ϕ says that every stage has a later stage where ϕ is true,
or in finite trees, each end node makes ϕ true. This is close to saying that, barring
details of the process structure, we ‘know’ now already that ϕ must be factually true.
Intuitionism distinguishes this from having verified ϕ per se, a distinction to which
we will return.
3.2 Modal logic and ‘unloaded’ explicit information structure
By their loading of the classical logical constants, intuitionistic formulas describe the
structure of an information process in a somewhat roundabout way. A more straight-
forward alternative was proposed in van Benthem (1989, 1996a), putting forward a
simple view of modal logic as a theory of information. We let the universal modality
say the following:
M, s  ϕ iff ϕ is true at all future states t ≥ s,
and then express everything in the earlier truth definition by letting classical constants
just stand for their old denotations, while reading an intuitionistic negation as the
modal combination ¬ϕ of a classical and a temporal operator, and an intuitionistic
implication as the modalized implication (ϕ → ψ).10 This setting is almost the
standard semantics of the modal logic S4, except for the fact that atomic propositions
are upward preserved.11
10 This link to intuitionistic logic is nothing but the famous Gödel translation into S4.
11 Thus, our complete logic is S4 plus additional atomic persistence laws p →  p. Incidentally, this does
mean that the set of validities is not substitution-closed.
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The modal language is more expressive, however, since it can also make further
types of assertion about the current information stage. Typically, existential modal
formulas ♦ϕ say that the formula ϕ may still become true later, which may be useful
as intermediate process assertions just like the “maybe”s that we employ in ordinary
language. Unlike intuitionistic assertions, however, these are not persistent, as new
facts moving us higher up in the tree may preclude ϕ from becoming true. Modulo a
few technicalities, the intuitionistic language is the ‘persistent fragment’ of the modal
one, and hence the two views of informational processes go well together as one
intuitionistic/modal paradigm.
3.3 Modal logic as information theory
Here are a few further features of the modal framework.
First, it is often said that the above means, without further ado, that intuition-
istic logic ‘lies embedded in the epistemic logic S4’, which differs from the usual
epistemic logics in having positive introspection (the axiom ϕ → ϕ), but not
negative introspection, which would be the invalid S5-axiom that ♦ϕ → ♦ϕ. This
is extremely misleading. The modal operator packages factual information about end-
points with something else: viz. the above procedural information about the current
process leading up to there. In this light, the failure of negative introspection is wholly
understandable as coming from the temporal logic, rather than from our bare access
to the factual information content.
In general, the modal language affords a more explicit view of further tree struc-
ture that one might want to impose. Suppose we want the process to have a uniform
description in terms of available information-producing moves. Say, we can make
observations about proposition letters one by one, determining whether they are true
or false. In that case, some intuitionistically acceptable trees are ruled out as possi-
ble process descriptions. For instance, we cannot have an initial node without p, q
true go immediately to an end-point having both p, q true—and this missing model
will be reflected in new validities beyond modal S4, say, (¬p ∧ ¬q ∧ ♦(p ∧ q)) →
♦(p ∧ ¬q)∨♦(q ∧ ¬p). Indeed, it is easy to construct more sophisticated examples
of constraints on trees arising in this way.12
Finally, the modal view set forth here is related to earlier information-based mod-
els, such as the ‘data semantics’ of Veltman (1984), Landman (1986). But there is a
difference. Data semantics is about universes of information pieces that stand to each
other in an inclusion relation. However, there is no coherent view of the worlds s in
the above models as ‘information pieces’.13 Our worlds are stages of an investigation,
12 There are some complications here. The logic of the particular restriction on atomic observations is not
substitution-closed, as we saw, since it treats proposition letters differently from complex formulas. Also,
in terms of more general restrictions leading to intermediate logics—cf. Footnote 8—the situation is made
somewhat uninteresting by our restriction to trees. E.g., the natural schematic constraint of ‘Weak Excluded
Middle’ ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ which expresses ‘convergence’ over arbitrary Kripke models, would force our trees to
be linear chains, making the information process rather trivial.
13 Analogies with categorical or relevant logics of information pieces remain strong, but just how?
Likewise, connections with Scott information systems remain tantalizing.
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but these do not admit of a natural calculus of addition, and even the associated sets
of formulas true at worlds, another candidate for ‘information pieces’, do not seem to
have that structure either.14
3.4 Coda: decoupling factual and procedural information in temporal logics
Our crucial distinction between procedural and factual information lives inside our
modal language, since the  operator involves both. But this intriguing mixture may
also be a source of confusions. At least, there is a wide-spread alternative for describ-
ing information trees, treating them in just the same way as any other process, viz. in




But now, we evaluate formulas at points s on histories h (complete branches through
the tree), splitting our language more radically into modal and temporal aspects:
M, h, s  Gϕ iff for all t ≥ s, M, h, t  ϕ (‘always in the f uture’)
M, h, s  ϕ iff for all k =s h, M, k, s  ϕ (‘necessarily now’)
where k =s h if the two histories k, h are the same up to and including the point s.
In this setting, the complete histories may be viewed as the possible outcomes of the
process. The earlier modal box ϕ says that ϕ is true at each stage on each future
history: which would now be written explicitly as Gϕ, separating out modal and
temporal aspects. We will return to this temporal perspective below, since it also lies
beyond epistemic logic.
3.5 Remark on mathematical foundations
We end with a digression. We have embedded intuitionistic logic in larger explicit
modal-temporal theories of information processes. Does this make any sense from its
original motivation, as an account of constructive mathematical reasoning? Or is it
just a twist toward a latter-day theme: rational agency and information flow? I think
it might be very interesting to rethink the issues here. Both classical and construc-
tive meta-mathematics focus on mathematical theories, the products of some rational
14 Over arbitrary Kripke models, instead of just trees, moving to a view of states as information sets rather
than temporal stages, van Benthem (1996b) proposes two new binary modal operators for the natural lattice
operators of supremum and infimum. These correspond roughly to taking deductive closures of unions and
intersections, respectively, of factual theories associated with the nodes.
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process of development that is left implicit. But if we were to study mathematical
theories together with an explicit logical account of the dynamic processes producing
them, the richer systems in this section might make a lot of foundational sense.
4 Epistemic logic and information
Now let us forget the intuitionistic perspective for a while, and briefly recall the basics
of another paradigm for dealing with information flow, viz. epistemic logic in its
modern dynamic sense (van Benthem and Martinez 2007; Baltag et al. 2008).
4.1 Base language and models
The base language has operators Kiϕ for ‘agent i knows that ϕ′, interpreted over mod-
els M = (W, {Ri }i∈I , V ) where the Ri are epistemic accessibility relations among
the worlds for the agents.15 More precisely, as mentioned earlier:
M, s  Kiϕ iff M, t  ϕ for all t with Ri st.
Details of this framework can be looked up in any standard text, and we will not
dwell on them here, except to note that we will use equivalence relations, validating
the system of ‘multi-S5’. Thus it seems that we are already far from the ‘epistemic
logic’ behind intuitionism, which merely validated modal S4, endorsing just positive
introspection. But this ‘S4 versus S5’ is merely the usual ‘shallow analysis’, defining
notions of knowledge or belief by the syntactic axioms they verify, rather than the
deeper semantic conception underlying them. Axioms are symptoms! We will see later
that ‘S4’ and ‘S5’ live in perfect harmony, once we ‘de-construct’ intuitionistic models
in the right manner.
Another crucial observation right now is that we are not looking at epistemic logic
as an account of the philosopher’s notion of knowledge. As argued in van Benthem
(2006a), van Benthem and Martinez (2007), the operator Ki should really be read as“to
the best of agent i’s information”, viewing the accessibility relations Ri as defining
agents’ current range of uncertainty, i.e., as information states in the folklore sense.
This range view comes with another idea from the common sense, viz. that new infor-
mation decreases the current range, while ideal information is just the singleton set
{w} with w the actual world. This brings us to the idea that this dynamics should itself
be an explicit part of the logic.
4.2 Information dynamics: observation and communication
For our purposes, it suffices to consider the so-called logic of public announce-
ments: events !P of new hard information which change irrevocably what I currently
15
‘Worlds’ here can be as light as hands in your current card game, or the possible states of the light
switches in your home. The old discussion about full-fledged metaphysical possible worlds which would
not even make the most baroque episodes of Star Trek seems largely over, fortunately.
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know. These can be linguistic communications from some perfectly reliable source, or
public inter-subjective observations. Formally, such an event triggers a change in the
current epistemic model (M, s) with actual world s. More specifically, !P eliminates
all worlds incompatible with P , thereby zooming in on the actual situation. Thus the
current model (M, s) changes into its definable sub-model (M |P, s), whose domain
is the set {t ∈ M | M, t  P}. In a picture, one goes
from M, s     to M|P, s
             s     s
   P     ¬P 
Typically, truth values of formulas change in such an update step: agents who did
not know P now do after the event !P . This leads to subtle phenomena, but one can
keep track of them in public announcement logic PAL, extending epistemic logic with
action expressions:
Formulas P: p | ¬φ |φ ∨ ψ | Kiφ | CGφ | [A]φ
Action expressions A: !P
The fundamental semantic clause for the dynamic action modality is as follows:
M, s  [!P]φ iff if M, s  P, then M|P, s  φ
As for the corresponding calculus of ‘hard information flow’, since these ideas are still
less familiar than ‘hard core’ static epistemic logic, we note that PAL is axiomatized
completely by the usual laws of epistemic logic plus the following recursion axioms:
[!P]q ↔ P → q (for atomic facts q)
[!P]¬φ ↔ P → ¬[!P]φ
[!P]φ ∧ ψ ↔ [!P]φ ∧ [!P]ψ
[!P]Kiφ ↔ P → Ki (P → [!P]φ)
These axioms are the ‘recursion equations’ of public information flow, performing a
step-by-step compositional analysis of epistemic effects of arbitrary events of incom-
ing hard information. In particular, the final axiom relates the knowledge that agents
get after receiving new information to conditional knowledge which they already had
before.16 For details, cf. e.g., van Benthem (2006b), van Ditmarsch et al. (2007).
16 Strictly speaking, this validity assumes perfect memory and other idealized epistemic features of agents.
Richer systems of dynamic-epistemic logic (DEL) exist in this spirit which can deal with information flow
in more complex settings, such as card games, where not all players have equal observational access to the
current event: say, your drawing a card from the current stack.
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4.3 Observational and inferential dynamics
In concrete scenarios of information flow, observation is often deeply intertwined with
inference (van Benthem 1996a). But PAL only ‘dynamifies’ the former, not the latter
events. Though the logic allows for inferences about effect of observations, it does
not treat inference itself as a dynamic process. This issue is related to the general dif-
ficulty of providing a satisfactory account of ‘inferential information’ (van Benthem
and Martinez 2007; Sequoiah-Grayson 2007). There seems to be a challenge here,
all the more so from the earlier intuitionistic perspective, which after all, started out
with formal proof. A first solution in a PAL framework was proposed in van Benthem
(2008b), inspired by ideas from Jago (2006), allowing for updates to be caused by
observations, as well as by calls to inference rules. This issue will return below. But
for now, we address another concern, closer to the semantic analysis of observations.
4.4 Saving the procedural information: dynamic-epistemic logic with protocols
Though PAL looks both information-oriented and procedural, there is a flaw from the
perspective of our earlier analysis of intuitionistic logic. Technically, working inside
out, successive application of the recursion axioms will reduce any assertion in this
dynamic-epistemic language to an equivalent static purely epistemic formula. Thus,
only factual information remains, while the procedural information encoded in the
dynamic modalities evaporates. While one can put a plausible positive spin on this
reduction, we seem to be missing a semantic parameter: often called ‘protocol infor-
mation’ about the temporal evolution of the relevant informational process. Not all
observations might be available in any order, not everything that is currently true can
be said in civilized conversation, and so on.
Accordingly, van Benthem et al. (2007) propose a protocol-based version TPAL of
public announcement logic describing temporal evolutions consisting of
a family of finite or infinite sequences of update events !P over time, starting
from some initial epistemic model.
Such structures are closely related to the epistemic-temporal models of Fagin et al.
(1995) and Parikh and Ramanujam (2003) (cf. van Benthem and Pacuit 2006), which
have the same branching structure discussed at the end of Sect. 3 above.
We hope that this sketch suffices (the full machinery and results are in the cited
paper). Now the earlier recursion axiom for knowledge after update changes to the
following new valid equivalence—where the crucial role of the procedural information
now becomes explicit:
[!P]Kiφ ↔ <!P>T → Ki (<!P>T → [!P]φ)
In words, the agent will know that φ after event !P has taken place, iff, when the
latter event is executable at all, he knows beforehand that, conditional on its execu-
tability, !P will produce effect φ. This blocks the earlier epistemic reduction, since
irreducible procedural assertions <!P>T about what can be observed or announced
[339] 123
262 Synthese (2009) 167:251–270
according to the current protocol will now remain crucial to ‘unpacking’ complex
dynamic-epistemic formulas.
There are actually some variant [!P]Kiφ axioms for this logic, depending on how
much agents are taken to know about the current protocol. In epistemic-temporal log-
ics, that protocol is usually common knowledge, but in the most general version of
TPAL, agents need not know the current protocol at all, which shows in the fact that
different sequences of events !P (including the empty sequence) may be attached to
different accessible worlds in the initial epistemic model. These finer distinctions will
return in what follows.
It may be clear where we are heading: dynamic-epistemic TPAL protocol models
seems close in spirit to our earlier intuitionistic/modal models as an account of inves-
tigative processes mixing factual and procedural information. This will be the subject
of the following section.
5 From intuitionistic/modal to epistemic models of information
5.1 Introduction
How would we model the intuitionistic/modal informational scenarios of Sects. 2, 3
in dynamic-epistemic logic? Consider one of our trees again:
1 
5   p 
2 p, q  3 p, ¬q 4 ¬p, q 
Epistemic logic assigns knowledge about some relevant situation in terms of possible
worlds representing ways that situation might be. At stages of the tree, the obvious
candidates for this are the end points below it (intuitionistically, these recorded com-
plete valuations about the facts of the matter): or equivalently, the complete histories
of the process. Thus, we can assign epistemic models at each node as follows:
          {2, 3, 4} 
  {2, 3} 
{2}      {3}       {4} 
One way of seeing this is as a family of epistemic models which decrease over time.17
Factual knowledge is then what is true in all current worlds. Moreover, the steps in the
17 Actually, at some peculiar stages, no decrease may take place at all: see below.
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tree seem to correspond to epistemic events adding information about the current set
of options. Let us now discuss this in more detail, fishing for more interesting things.
5.2 Trading future for current uncertainty in games
The preceding is reminiscent of an issue in the epistemic analysis of games. In a game
of ‘perfect information’, players know where they are at each node in the extensive
game tree, but they do not know how the future will develop. But there is also a folklore
observation that such ‘global’ uncertainty about the future can be converted into ‘local’
uncertainty about the present. The construction is simply this (cf. van Benthem 2004
for a slightly more formal version). Given any game tree G, assign epistemic models
Ms to each node s whose domain is the set of complete histories passing through s
(which all share the same past up to s), letting the agent be uncertain about all of
them. ‘Worlds’ in these models may be seen as pairs (h, s) with h any history passing
through s.18 It is natural to view the resulting structure M(G) as a TPAL protocol
model, where the actions are announcements which move is taking place. This will
cut down the current set of histories in just the right manner.19
5.3 Languages
This was about the structures, but what about matching languages? As usual with
model constructions, the elegant language connection runs in the opposite direction.
Consider a language over the induced models M(G) which has proposition letters
p true at worlds (h, s), Boolean operations, one-step modal operators <!a>ϕ for
announcing that move a is played, plus an iterated version <*>ϕ of this saying that
formula ϕ is true after some finite sequence of moves. Moreover, the language will
have an epistemic operator Kϕ quantifying over all currently accessible worlds as
constructed above. The proper comparison for this formalism is clearly with a branch-
ing-temporal language associated with the game G, evaluating formulas ϕ as before
in the format G, h, s  ϕ.
Indeed, there is an obvious translation τ from the language of M(G) to that of G.
Proposition letters remain the same, so do Booleans, announcement modalities <!a>
go to action modalities <a>, future modalities <∗> go to the modal-temporal ♦F (‘in
the future on some currently indistinguishable history’) in the branching-time sense
of Sect. 3, and finally, the epistemic modality K becomes exactly the local universal
modality  of our earlier discussion of branching temporal models. In all, this trans-
lation τ supports the following equivalence, whose proof is a simple induction:
18 We will ignore multi-agent issues, important though these are to games.
19 Actually, a game of perfect information becomes a so-called game of imperfect information in this
manner, and this raises further issues. For instance, it is natural to distinguish two kinds of imperfect infor-
mation in such games, observation uncertainty about how the game has developed so far, and expectation
uncertainty about how it is going to continue. The former is the main sort of uncertainty analyzed in
dynamic-epistemic and epistemic-temporal logics, and it is interesting to see what role it might play in an
intuitionistic setting. Nodes in our trees might then have epistemic accessibility links, as in ‘intuitionistic
modal logics’; cf. Bozic and Dosen (1984).
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M(G), (h, s)  ϕ iff G, h, s  τ(ϕ).
While this is pleasing, it may not satisfy readers expecting a translation in the oppo-
site direction, reducing modal talk about games G to translated talk about the models
M(G). But we can say at least this much: the central future modality  of the games,
viewed as analogues of our intuitionistic-modal tree models, corresponds precisely
with the operator combination K [∗] of the models M(G). A more precise discussion
of languages appropriate to our game structures would involve a deeper analysis of
appropriate notions of epistemic-temporal bisimulation, which we forego here.20
5.4 From intuitionistic-modal models to TPAL protocol models
In principle, the same construction converts intuitionistic or modal tree models into
TPAL protocol models. But there are also differences with the above scenario. First,
we lack unique labels for the ‘moves’ in our tree: they are just anonymous upward
inclusion links, which we can only identify by what is true at nodes after them. Also,
we have no unique description of each history, since we need not (and in general, can-
not) assume that different end-points in the tree carry different valuations.21 In other
words, we want to ‘dynamify’ intuitionistic-modal models by making their hidden
actions explicit, but what are they really?
We will discuss this in a moment, but for now, we note one further thing which
makes the resulting models special among all TPAL protocol models. In general, a
TPAL model may get stuck at the end of a history with some epistemic model whose
worlds cannot be distinguished by further available events !P . But in our converted
tree models, each individual world (read: history) is identified uniquely as the only
‘survivor’ at the end of its announcement history. We may call TPAL models like this
revealing: a unique world always comes out. This reflects the initial motivation for
intuitionistic models at the beginning of this paper: at end-points, they have identified
the true world uniquely.
5.5 Announcement actions
The first type of action naturally associated with transitions in intuitionistic-modal tree
models are public announcements. Assuming that each end-point is uniquely definable
in the modal language, each stepwise shrinking of the set of reachable endpoints can
be defined as the announcement of the negations of all definitions for the endpoints
that drop out. And in case there is no reduction in reachable endpoints (see below), we
can still put the announcement !T . Disregarding the behaviour of proposition letters,
this is probably all that can be said. Thus, to a first approximation,
20 Extended bisimulations would also make sense for TPAL epistemic temporal protocol models.
21 Unique definability might have a bit more of a chance if we allowed past modalities in our epistemic
temporal language, describing the unique histories that led up to the end-points.
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Intuitionistic logic describes effects of observations of facts, but without making
the nature of these observations explicit.
There is more to be said here. Given the possible non-distinguishability of stages in the
tree, available announcements may run short, and many interesting technical issues
can be raised.22 I leave these matters to another occasion, since they do not add to my
present purposes.
5.6 Actions of explicit ‘seeing’
Much more intriguing, however, is the need for a second type of dynamic action
beyond our TPAL models, which comes to light when we consider our initial exam-
ples in Sect. 2 of failure for the Double Negation law:
p p 
M1 M2
The second model M2 poses no problems. We put different singletons at the
end-points, and their union at the root. A protocol with just the announcements !p and
!¬p will ‘split’ these as required. But now consider the first model M1. One natural
TPAL version would just put the same singleton set {s} at both nodes, since nothing
is ruled out going from one to the other. But then, no information can flow, and, if
we think of p as a property of the end state, we already knew that p at the initial
stage, by the semantics of the K operator. Knowledge of a formula in this sense, how-
ever, matches the intuitionistic operator ¬¬, or its modal counterpart ♦, referring to
eventual truth in all reachable end-points. But the point of intuitionistic models is that
actually putting p at a stage means more than its ‘inevitability’ in this sense. What
stronger event is taking place?
Before going there, let us avoid a confusion. While we can treat proposition letters
true at end-points as true at the epistemic worlds in our TPAL model corresponding
to that endpoint, proposition letters true at stages (not yet complete histories) had
better be viewed as variants p∗, which imply, without being implied by, epistemic
formulas Kp.
5.7 Phantom worlds and partial protocols
I can see two ways to go with this scenario. One adds new ‘phantom worlds’ to
the epistemic models at each stage, which do not support any events in the protocol
(which has to be ‘local’ now in the earlier-mentioned sense). Thus, we might have the
following structure:
22 E.g., the construction may work better when we identify trees modulo bisimulation.
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s: p       s: p 
t: ¬p  
Note that, in this way, the TPAL model is no longer revealing in the earlier sense.
We no longer have Kp at the initial world s, even though the only available sequence
of events will lead to knowledge that p. But actually, I myself incline towards the
following alternative.
5.8 Explicit acts of seeing
What intuitive event corresponds to getting a proposition letter p true at some stage in
an intuitionistic model, even when we already had knowledge of p in the inevitability
sense? To me, this is the event of seeing as in the exclamation “I see”: viz. a con-
scious realization of knowledge which I had only implicitly. But this calls for another
modeling, more in line with the proposals in van Benthem (2008b):
We endow each world with a store of formulas already seen to be true at it, making
new worlds consist of pairs (w, X) with X a set of formulas true at w. Now there
are two kinds of ‘seeing’, one implicit, one implicit (cf. Barwise and Perry 1983
for discussion of the contrast). The implicit kind are our public announcements !P ,
which remove pairs (w, X) where w does not satisfy P in the current model. The
explicit variant +P makes the same removal, but it also adds the formula P to the
X -component of all worlds that remain. Viewed in this sense, an atom p at some stage
in an intuitionistic-modal model indicates that it is not only true, but also belongs to
the explicit store. Of course, this would require extending TPAL to deal with explicit
‘storage worlds’, which has not happened yet.23
I find this outcome truly amazing. In a plausible sense, intuitionistic logic gets
connected to both dynamic-epistemic logic and more syntactic logics of explicit
seeing and ‘awareness’, merging events of public observation with private acts of real-
ization. I must leave exploration of this duality to another occasion (cf. van Benthem
2008a).
In particular, the internal events described in this way may arise in any way that
converts implicit knowledge into explicit knowledge: an explicit observation, a con-
scious inference, an act of introspection, and so on. Thus, they unify across a ‘genre’.
Many further issues will occur to the reader here, such as the appropriate choice of
temporal languages, or the mechanics of converse transformations from TPAL proto-
col models into intuitionistic-modal ones. But I think the links made here are enough
to ponder already. In any case, my aim with this section has not been to reduce one
paradigm to the other, but rather to see what happens when we put them side by
side.
23 Hoshi (2008) uses the syntactic power of local protocols in TPAL to model events beyond purely obser-
vational update, such as making inference steps.
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6 Conclusions, objections, and further issues
6.1 Information dynamics and rational agency
This paper shows how to view intuitionistic logic as part of a larger epistemic-
temporal logic of constrained informational processes. This observation is not new,
and van Benthem (1989, 1996b), already develop it in some detail. But we added the
point that, in its insistence on both factual and procedural information, intuitionis-
tic-modal logic fits particularly well with current protocol-based dynamic-epistemic
logics. The latter systems, in my view, are stepping stones toward an account of rational
agents that engage in actions of observation, inference, and communication on a par,
and we have seen that intuitionistic-modal logic indeed goes beyond a dynamic logic
of brute observation. A next step should be the treatment of inferential dynamics, a
point to which we return in a moment. In addition, the agency view links intuitionism
with theories of update, belief revision and learning.24 What the original motivation
for intuitionism might have to add to this modern theory of rational agency are pro-
cesses less commonly studied, such as the dynamics of definition, and creation of new
objects.
6.2 But how true is this to intuitionism?
Our procedural analysis is really just one way of construing the dynamics in intuition-
istic semantics, and Samson Abramsky and Tim Williamson have pointed out others.
For instance, another procedural reading for the above two-world model M1 would
go as follows:
One may reach the endpoint where p is true, but one may also get stuck forever
at the first stage where p is not available.25
As pointed out by Dan Isaacson, this alternative take becomes even more vivid in
the Beth model associated with the Kripke model M1, which would be an infinite
p-less comb with p-teeth sticking out at each stage. While acknowledging all this, I
would claim that (i) the optimal procedural interpretation of intuitionistic models is
not settled, and deserves more attention, (ii) this interpretation may allow for genuine
alternatives, and (iii) the particular option I explore in this paper, with forced pro-
gression along nodes, is of interest in its own right, since it is highly appealing from
a logical point of view to think of procedures that mix external acts of fact-finding
with internal acts of inference, realization, or whatever ways our mind has of turning
implicit into explicit knowledge.
24 van Benthem (1989) makes this point as well, though in a very different technical setting.
25 This seems closer to the dead-lock option in the ‘phantom world’ scenario mentioned earlier. More gen-
erally, the construal with an option of staying at some intermediate node forever is one of the motivations
behind domain theory: see Abramsky (2008).
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6.3 Even so, what about proof?
While the preceding seems largely true to me, the fact remains that intuitionistic logic
arose as an analysis of mathematical proof. But our analysis in this paper has com-
pletely downplayed this aspect, going the opposite semantic way. There are many
questions here to which I have no answer, merely some observations. First, there is
still an intimate connection between truth in Beth or Kripke semantics for intuitionistic
logic and provability in models used in completeness proofs. In particular, the modal
accessibility relation in an intuitionistic Henkin model is just set inclusion between
disjunction-splitting consistent sets. This supports the intuitive idea of information
stages that really grow all the time26—though it has to said that the act of stepping
from one deductively closed set to a proper extension in the Henkin model means
acquiring an additional fact beyond drawing an intuitionistically valid conclusion.
Also, in our models, I do find it difficult to make immediate sense of the original
idea of intuitionism as proof. Consider a Modus Ponens inference from ϕ and ϕ → ψ
to ψ . The semantics has no dynamic counterpart to this, since it says that if both
premises are true at a stage of the information process, then so is the conclusion.27 On
the other hand, the proof-theoretic interpretation naturally says that providing a proof
x for ϕ and y for ϕ → ψ leads to the new action of providing a proof ‘x + y’ for
ψ . While this natural inferential dynamics has semantic counterparts in models for
relevant or categorical logic (cf. Dunn 2008), these do not show up in our dynamic-
epistemic analysis. Thus, a dynamic logic of inference steps, as hinted at above, seems
a plausible addition.28,29
6.4 Intuitionistic logic and multi-agent interaction
But precisely through the notion of proof, intuitionistic logic seems to have even more
radical connections with the theory of rational agency. Constructive proofs were ana-
lyzed as winning strategies in two-player argumentative dialogues as early as Lorenzen
(1955), and this theme has turned out fruitful generally in the ‘game semantics’ of
linear logic and programming (cf. Abramsky 2008). Moreover, the many links with
games in the literature on dynamic-epistemic logic suggest that this link may be more
than a coincidence, also in our semantic setting.
Frankly, I am somewhat undecided on what to make of this right now. It might be
that intuitionistic logic points the way towards a grand synthesis of information anal-
ysis in the standard model-theoretic style with the dynamic view of logic as embodied
in proof and games. Or it might also be that this meeting is a ‘lucky fluke’, since the
26 By contrast, non-persistent existential modalities ♦ϕ mess up this idyllic inclusion picture, while also
leading to more complex interpretations in terms of non-provability.
27 Perhaps one might view an intuitionistic implication or a modalized (p → q) as expressing a dynamic
dependency between the two variables p, q : if one becomes manifest, so does the other.
28 Cf. Jago (2007), Velazquez (2008), Hoshi (2008) for current attempts in dynamic logic style.
29 I forego a comparison with the proof- and category-theoretic perspective of Abramsky (2008), which
rather identifies the ‘intrinsic dynamics’ of intuitionistic formulas with their role as objects in suitable
categories where proofs are morphisms.
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intuitionistic language is so weak in expressive power that it happens to combine these
different interpretations.
7 Three conclusions
This paper suggests three conclusions. First of all, intuitionistic logic remains a fasci-
nating ‘implicit’ account of information, both factual and procedural, which suggests
intriguing new connections to epistemic logic in its current dynamic guises as an
‘explicit’ account of information that agents may have and trade. Next, such a new
take on intuitionistic logic suggests that the venerable foundations of mathematics
might at the same time be the most avant-garde theory of agency. And finally, and
more generally, the case study of this paper confirms a pleasant suspicion of mine:
start with rethinking any major topic anywhere in logic, and you will find a theory of
information underneath.
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